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Abstract
We revisit Greif’s (1993) analysis of trade between the 11th-century
Maghribi traders and present two diﬀerent models which bring into
play, in an essential way, historical features of the Maghribi’s organi-
zation which had no role in Greif’s own analysis. Our reformulation
of the Maghribi’s "punishment strategies" incorporates principal com-
ponents of their actual historical practice and explains why they may
have been necessary to sustain cooperation, especially in the pres-
ence of uncertainty or imperfect information. We also model "formal
friendships," or trade through bilateral and multilateral partnerships,
and predict the Maghribi’s practice of providing agency services with-
out pecuniary compensation. We are thus able to provide a richer and
more accurate picture of how that organization facilitated trade be-
tween widely-dispersed traders in the absence of a reliable legal system
to enforce merchant contracts.
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"The goods sent by you arrived safely through God’s grace...."
(Joseph Taherti, a Maghribi trader, 1063 AD)
"Before setting out eastward to India, Joseph traveled westward
to Tunisia and collected goods from other merchants in order to
trade with them on his way. His trip to India, however, was
marred by shipwreck and other misfortunes involving great losses.
As is natural, he faced many lawsuits on his return." (Report of
a trip of Joseph Lebdi, a Maghribi trader, 1097 AD)
1 Introduction
Greif’s (1993) path-breaking study of trade amongst the Maghribi traders
(see also Greif, 1989) represents an early attempt to apply formal game-
theoretic tools to the study of economic history. It is therefore both highly
regarded and deservedly influential. The purpose of this paper is to point
to a number of lacunae in Greif’s analysis which make it worth revisiting.
Doing so leads us to develop two diﬀerent models of Maghribi trade relation-
ships which bring into play - in an essential way - historical features of the
Maghribi’s organization which had no role in Greif’s own analysis. We are
thus able to provide a richer and more accurate picture of how that organi-
zation facilitated trade amongst widely-dispersed traders in the absence of a
reliable legal system to enforce merchant contracts.
Jewish Maghribi traders were engaged in long-distance trade all over the
Muslim Mediterranean in the 10th to 12th centuries (Greif, 1989, 1993;
Goitein, 1973). It was eﬃcient to operate through overseas agents rather
than having each merchant travel abroad with his goods.1 Agency relations
enabled some merchants to operate as sedentary traders, thus saving the cost
and risk of sea journeys, and enabled traveling merchants to rely on agents
to handle their aﬀairs in their absence. But because agents could cheat while
handling a merchant’s capital, to be employed they had to be able to commit
ex ante to being honest ex post, after the goods were sent to them. Without
1Agents provided merchants with many trade-related services, including loading and
unloading ships; paying customs, bribes, and transportation fees; storing the goods; trans-
ferring the goods to the market; and deciding when, how, and to whom to sell the goods,
and at what price. Greif (2006), Chapter 3.
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an institution to support honesty, merchants would have anticipated oppor-
tunistic behavior and refused to hire agents. Mutually beneficial exchanges
would not have occurred.
Greif’s analysis resolves this commitment problem by positing a "multi-
lateral reputation mechanism," based on a review of the historical evidence.2
In his model, an agent who embezzles the goods of any Maghribi merchant
is branded a "cheater" and not employed thereafter by any merchant (the
"collective" or "multilateral" punishment strategy). Amongst the Maghribis,
the collective punishment of cheating agents was made feasible by the trans-
mission of detailed information between merchants on agents’ past behavior.
Further, merchants were motivated not to hire an agent who had cheated
(i.e. to participate in the collective punishment) via the wage premium re-
quired to keep an agent with a "reputation" for cheating honest. Since an
agent subject to multilateral punishment was not expected to be hired by
any other merchant, his loss from cheating if re-hired was less than that of an
"honest" agent. Given a choice, merchants would not wish to hire a cheater
since it was necessary to pay him more than an honest agent to induce co-
operation. Thus, in Greif’s analysis the multilateral punishment strategy
is made self-enforcing by the wage diﬀerential between honest agents and
cheaters.
Two issues arise in Greif’s formulation of the Maghribi’s collective punish-
ment strategy which deserve reconsideration. The first is that the specified
multilateral punishment strategies are only an equilibrium if there are lit-
erally no costs to merchants of switching agents, or if every agent’s actions
are observed by every merchant. In the absence of one or another of these
assumptions, merchants will never wish to fire an agent who has cheated, so
agents will always cheat, and the equilibrium unravels.3 But Greif himself
tells us that switching agents was costly for the Maghribi merchants, and
we shall argue that the assumption of multilateral (as opposed to bilateral)
perfect information is not supported by the historical evidence. Indeed, the
historical evidence makes it clear that although Maghribi merchants may
2See also Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) who use a multilateral reputation mech-
anism to support eﬃcient trade between medieval cities and merchant guilds.
3This is true so long as we restrict attention to the "simple" punishment strategies used
by Greif (1993), which prohibit "second" and "higher-order" punishments, on the grounds
of historical plausibility. See the discussion below.
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have been able to monitor the actions of their own agents with consider-
able accuracy (justifying the assumption of bilateral perfect information),
they did not directly observe the actions of other merchants’ agents. Hence
the equilibrium strategies specified in Greif (1993) would not appear to be
sustainable under more realistic historical assumptions.
The solution to this problem turns out to be contained in Greif’s own
reports of the way the Maghribi traders actually dealt with agents whom
they believed had cheated them. The Maghribis punished transgressions by
ostracizing (i.e. firing and not re-employing) an agent who had cheated until
compensation was paid to the victim. Once compensation had been paid,
normal commercial relations with the agent were resumed. We show that
with compensation of this type there is a multilateral punishment strategy
equilibrium similar to the equilibrium specified by Greif, but supported by
diﬀerent equilibrium strategies, and which allows for the same level of mutu-
ally advantageous trade to occur. In our equilibrium, if an agent cheats he is
never fired, but pays the merchant compensation which (weakly) exceeds the
one period gain from cheating, and is less than the net payoﬀ from remain-
ing unemployed forever. Agents will always choose to pay such compensation
in equilibrium, and this prevents cheating in Greif’s eﬃciency wage model.
This formulation of the Maghribi’s "punishment strategies" thus incorporates
a principal component of the Maghribi’s actual historical practice into the
model and explains why it may have been necessary to sustain cooperation.
In addition, our analysis also shows why the Maghribi practice of allowing
any trader to cheat a merchant who had himself been accused of cheating,
may have been needed to discourage merchants frommaking false accusations
of cheating. Given a likely prospect of receiving compensation, merchants will
strictly prefer to report that their agent has cheated, whether he has or not.
This issue does not arise in Greif’s (1993) formulation of the equilibrium
strategies, since merchants had no incentive to make false reports in his
analysis.
Despite the obvious merit of analyzing the actual "institution" used by
the Maghribis to support cooperation, and under more plausible historical
assumptions, our model nevertheless predicts the same level of trade in equi-
librium as Greif’s (and punishments are never used in either model). Hence
the predictions of the two models are observationally equivalent under either
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multilateral or bilateral perfect information. An important advantage of the
use of compensation to sustain cooperation, however, is that it is a more
eﬃcient institution in the presence of uncertainty, or an inability to perfectly
monitor agents’ actions. We therefore extend Greif’s model by allowing for a
small amount of uncertainty over whether an agent has cheated or not in any
period (i.e. bilateral imperfect information), and for the equilibrium level
of trade to be endogenously determined. The predictions of the two mod-
els then no longer coincide. Under the collective punishment strategy used
by Greif (1993), a lower value of trade is chosen by merchants in every pe-
riod than in the equilibrium supported by compensation payments. Further,
under Greif’s specification of his model, cooperative trade collapses once a
suﬃcient number of agents acquire a reputation for cheating. This prob-
lem does not beset the punishment strategy requiring incentive-compatible
compensation payments to be made.
The second issue with Greif’s analysis is that his eﬃciency wage model
does not correspond very closely to the actual structure of Maghribi trading
relationships. According to Greif’s (1993) historical evidence (see also Greif,
1989; and Greif, 2006, Chapters 3 and 9), the Maghribi traders were a "closed
coalition" who did not hire "outsiders" as agents, and who typically acted
as agents and partners for each other in a network of intertwined, long-
run relationships.4 This structure of trade through bilateral and multilateral
partnerships and "formal friendships" is not that specified in Greif’s eﬃciency
wage model.5
When the model is adapted to reflect the specific structure of Maghribi
trading relationships, diﬀerent and interesting conclusions emerge. For ex-
ample, once traders act as both merchants and agents, we can easily predict
the Maghribi’s common practice of trading through "formal friendships" in
which they provided each other with agency services without pecuniary com-
pensation, in contrast to the eﬃciency wage model. And under bilateral im-
perfect information, compensation strategies allow for (weakly) lower wages
and higher levels of welfare to be sustained in equilibrium, since traders act-
4The predominant forms of trading relationship were partnerships and "formal friend-
ships." See Goitein (1967), Chapters III.B.1-III.B.4, and Greif (2006), Chapter 9.
5Nor does it correspond to his model of bilateral trade (Greif, 1993, Section 4). His
model would appear to correspond more closely to a situation in which a group of mer-
chants hires agents from a large pool of outsiders.
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ing as agents no longer face the risk of being ostracized when falsely accused
of cheating. We are also able to dispense with some other assumptions re-
quired in Greif’s analysis which are not strongly supported by the historical
evidence.
The equilibrium strategies posited in this paper to sustain cooperation
between widely-dispersed medieval traders would seem to more accurately
reflect, and explain, actual Maghribi practices. They also show how the
Maghribi traders avoided the ineﬃciencies involved in permanently ostraciz-
ing valuable trading partners, while still providing incentives for cooperation.
This is a desirable property in a world of imperfect information and imperfect
monitoring in which mistakes (i.e. false accusations of cheating) were likely
to occur.
Section 2 presents Greif’s eﬃciency wage model and describes the new
equilibrium strategies. Section 3 extends the model to allow for bilateral
imperfect information and endogenously determined levels of trade. Section
4 presents some simple results on modelling formal friendships, with and
without bilateral imperfect information. Section 5 considers related literature
and concludes.
2 The Eﬃciency Wage Model of Maghribi
Trading Relationships
Greif (1993) considers a complete information game withM merchants and A
agents, each of whom lives an infinite number of periods. There are assumed
to be more agents than merchants, A > M . Agents and merchants have
a common time discount factor δ, and an unemployed agent receives a per
period reservation utility of w ≥ 0. In each period, an agent can be employed
by only one merchant and a merchant can employ only one agent. Amerchant
who does not employ an agent receives a payoﬀ of κ > 0, and the gross gain
from cooperation (i.e. employment) is γ.
A merchant who hires an agent decides what wage, W > 0, to oﬀer the
agent. Since an employed agent holds the merchant’s capital, an agent is
ensured of receiving his wage. An agent who is oﬀered employment decides
whether to be honest or to cheat in any period. If the agent is honest, the
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merchant’s one-period payoﬀ is γ −W , and the agent’s payoﬀ is W . If the
agent cheats, his payoﬀ is α > 0 and the merchant’s payoﬀ is 0. Greif (1993)
assumes that γ > κ+ w, γ > α > w, and κ > γ − α.6
After the allocation of the payoﬀs, each merchant decides whether to
terminate his relations with his agent and search for a new agent. There is a
probability τ > 0, however, that a merchant is forced to fire his agent in any
period. Matching of unemployed agents with searching merchants is random,
but a merchant can make his hiring or retention decisions contingent upon
the actions previously taken by an agent.
Finally, Greif (1993) assumes "perfect information" in his model. We will
find it helpful in what follows to distinguish between two diﬀerent concepts
of perfect information. By bilateral perfect information we shall mean that
each merchant can perfectly monitor the actions of any agent he employs,
but not those of agents employed by other merchants. By multilateral perfect
information we shall mean that every merchant can perfectly monitor the
actions of every agent, whether employed by him or not. As we shall see, the
equilibrium strategies required to sustain cooperation will depend critically
on which of these types of perfect information is assumed.
Following Greif (1993), we will consider only historically plausible simple
punishment strategies in constructing an equilibrium. Simple punishment
strategies do not involve cheaters "collaborating" in their own punishments,
by punishing merchants who fail to punish cheating agents, and so on.7 Given
this restriction, Greif specifies multilateral punishment strategies in which in
each period each merchant oﬀers an agent a wage W ∗, retains the agent
if he was honest unless forced separation occurs, fires the agent if he has
cheated, never hires an agent who has ever cheated any merchant, and ran-
domly chooses an agent from amongst the unemployed agents who have never
cheated if forced separation occurs. An "honest" agent’s strategy (i.e. an
6These conditions imply respectively that cooperation is eﬃcient; cheating entails an
eﬃciency loss and agents prefer cheating to receiving their reservation utility; and mer-
chants prefer not hire an agent over paying a wage as high as the amount that the agent
can cheat them by.
7It has now become commonplace amongst sociobiologists to argue that we should not
expect to see ‘second’ and ‘higher-order’ punishments being used in real human groups
(see McElreath and Boyd 2005). Gintis (2004) claims that examples of the use of such
strategies in small-scale, or ‘hunter-gatherer’, societies are nonexistent.
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agent who has never cheated in the past) is to be honest if oﬀeredW ∗ and to
cheat if oﬀered less thanW ∗. A "cheater’s" strategy is cheat unless oﬀered a
wageW ∗c > W
∗. Greif (1993) demonstrates that these strategies can support
a (subgame perfect) equilibrium in which merchants will never wish to hire
an agent who has a "reputation" for cheating.8
To see this, let h denote the probability that an unemployed "honest"
agent (an agent who has never cheated in the past) will be rehired in any
period, Vh the lifetime expected utility of an employed honest agent, and V uh
the lifetime expected utility of an unemployed honest agent. Similarly, Vc
and V uc denote the expected lifetime utilities of an employed and unemployed
"cheater" respectively (i.e. of an agent who has ever cheated in the past).
Proposition 1 in Greif (1993) solves for the lowest wage W ∗ for which an
agent’s best response is to be honest in any period.9
Proposition 1 Assume δ, τ , h ∈ (0, 1). The lowest wage for which an ‘hon-
est’ agent’s best response is to be honest is W ∗ = w(δ, h, τ , w, α) > w , where
w(·) is monotonically decreasing in δ and h and monotonically increasing in
τ , w , and α.
Proof. For a given wageW, agents’ lifetime expected utilities can be written,
Vi = W + (1− τ)δVi + τδV ui , i = h, c
V uh = hVh + (1− h)(w + δV uh )
V uc = w + δV
u
c .
The payoﬀ from cheating once and then becoming an unemployed "cheater"
is given by α+ δV uc .
10 Setting Vh(W ∗) = α+ δV uc and solving for W
∗ yields,
W ∗ = [T − δτH]
·
α+
δw
1− δ
¸
− τδPw (1)
8Greif (1993) restricts attention to equilibria supported by symmetric and stationary
strategies. Other types of equilibria are possible when these restrictions are relaxed.
9We have simplified Greif’s (1993) formulation as we are not concerned with the analysis
of bilateral punishment strategies exposited in his Proposition 3. We have otherwise
followed Greif’s specification as closely as possible to keep comparisons with his analysis
simple.
10Note that this assumes that merchants will fire a cheater, an issue taken up below.
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where,
T = 1− δ(1− τ)
H =
h
1− δ(1− h) (2)
P =
1− h
1− δ(1− h)
The properties of w can be derived directly from this expression.
W ∗ is the minimum wage required to induce cooperation from agents
who have never cheated in equilibrium. Setting h = 0 in (1) defines W ∗c , the
minimum wage required to induce honesty in an agent who has a reputation
for cheating. Since W ∗c > W
∗, the wage required to induce honesty from
an agent who has cheated in the past is higher than that required to induce
cooperation from honest agents. Hence, so long as the number of honest
unemployed agents (weakly) exceeds the number of merchants searching for
an agent in any period, merchants will always prefer to hire an honest agent.
Note that there will only be trade if W ∗ ≤ γ− κ, requiring an additional
assumption on the parameters. Assuming that this is satisfied, it is easy
to show that oﬀering any higher stationary wage W ∗∗ > W ∗ can never be
a (subgame perfect) equilibrium given the restrictions on the strategies.11
However, autarky (or no trade) can also always be an equilibrium.12 ,13
11I.e. that they are ‘symmetric’ and ‘simple’. To show this we need to assume that
cheating by an agent when oﬀered a wage lower than W ∗∗ is suﬃcient to invoke the
multilateral punishment strategy, which appears to have been intended by Greif (1993).
Otherwise, there will be a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria supported by wage
oﬀers in the range W ∗ ≤W ∗∗ ≤W ∗c .
12An autarkic equilibrium can be constructed by specifying the following strategies:
merchants never hire agents and fire any agent they have hired at the end of each period,
whether the agent has cheated or not. Agents always cheat if oﬀered a wage less than α.
Clearly these strategies form an equilibrium, and permanent reversion to them in response
to an agent cheating could have been used to sustain the same equilibrium outcome as
that obtained in Proposition 1.
13Strictly speaking, to have demonstrated the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium
we need the specified strategies to be an equilibrium after every possible history, which
they are not (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, pp. 108-110). The relevant histories are
those which result in there being fewer remaining honest agents than there are merchants,
so the multilateral punishment strategy is no longer viable (i.e. self-enforcing). We can
simply specify a permanent reversion to the autarkic strategies after every such history,
however.
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If the probability of forced separation is assumed to be zero in the above
expressions (τ = 0), then we would have W ∗c = W
∗, so merchants would
be indiﬀerent between hiring an honest agent or a former cheater. This is
because under simple punishment strategies, an agent’s strategy does not
call on him to cheat any merchant who hires him simply because he has
cheated in the past (i.e. agents do not punish merchants for not following
the multilateral punishment strategy).14 As Greif (1993) observes, the equi-
librium would then rest on a "knife-edge" in which merchants only carried
out the multilateral punishment strategy because of indiﬀerence. The role
of the exogenous probability of forced separation is to break this indiﬀerence
by making the expected lifetime utility of an employed honest agent exceed
that of an employed cheater, even if the "cheater" intends to play honest in
the future, resulting in W ∗c > W
∗. As Greif (2006), pp. 76-77, puts it,
"The possibility of forced separation links the optimal wage a par-
ticular merchant has to pay his agent and the agent’s expected
future relations with other merchants. This link increases the op-
timal cheater’s wage above an honest agent’s wage. Hence mer-
chants find it optimal to follow the multilateral punishment, de-
spite the fact that the agent’s strategy does not call for cheating
any merchant who violated the collective punishment, and despite
the fact that cheating in the past does not indicate that the agent
is a "lemon."
2.1 The Problem and a New Approach
In the equilibrium described by Proposition 1, merchants strictly prefer not
to hire an agent with a reputation for cheating because of the wage diﬀeren-
tialW ∗c −W ∗. But why should a merchant should prefer to fire an agent who
has cheated him and search for a new agent? If we allow for only bilateral
perfect information in the model, merchants will be indiﬀerent between re-
taining or firing either a cheater or an honest agent. This is because nothing
is learned about an agent from observing oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path behavior
14Hence merchants would also be indiﬀerent between firing an agent who cheats them
and retaining him, since all agents’ continuation strategies call on them to play honest if
oﬀered the wage W ∗c =W
∗.
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(i.e. cheating),15 and under Greif’s specification of the equilibrium strategies,
agents are not required to punish merchants who violate the collective pun-
ishment strategy. Hence a merchant who fires an agent who has cheated and
hires a new agent - assuming that the new agent will play the hypothesized
equilibrium strategy - can equally well make the same assumption about the
agent he has already hired.16 So for any small cost of severing the agency
relationship and searching for a new agent, merchants will strictly prefer to
retain their current agent, whether he has cheated them or not. Given this,
agents who cheat will not be fired, so all agents will cheat and no agent will
ever be hired. Merchant-agent trade relations cannot be sustained.17
One could argue that since it is implicitly assumed in the model that
switching agents does not impose any cost, a merchant might as well fire a
cheater and hire a new agent. However, severing relations with a formerly
trusted agent was costly to the Maghribis, as Greif (1993)(2006) makes clear
in explicitly rejecting this approach.18 Since for any cost of switching agents
(no matter how small), merchants will strictly prefer to retain their current
agent, the specified strategies will not be an equilibrium if only bilateral
perfect information is assumed.
Can this problem be resolved in a way which restores the essential prop-
15What players should deduce from observing a zero-probability (oﬀ-the-equilibrium-
path) event is a much-discussed issue. As Dixit (2003) points out in a similar context,
any inference is consistent with observing such an event. Sustaining an equilibrium by
assigning arbitrary beliefs to traders at such junctures would clearly violate the historical
spirit of the exercise, however.
16That is, if an agent cheats in period t, in the subgame beginning at t+1, if the agent
hasn’t been fired and declared a cheater, his optimal strategy is not to cheat if he expects
to return to the equilibrium path of play.
17An obvious approach would be to apply the idea of "renegotiation-proofness" (Fuden-
berg and Tirole, 1991, Ch. 5; Farrell and Maskin, 1989; Farrell 2000). For any small cost
of severing the agency relationship, the merchant and agent would want to renegotiate the
equilibrium strategies if the agent has strayed from the equilibrium path and cheated (see
Proposition 3 below). Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994), for instance, appeal to the
concept of renegotiation-proofness to explain why the ruler of a medieval city could not
have been relied upon to punish violators of a merchant embargo by cheating them, when
mutually profitable trade was possible on terms which the ruler would credibly respect.
18See Greif (2006), p. 76 (also Greif, 1993, p. 534): "When switching agents does not
impose any cost–as assumed here–merchants may as well punish a cheater, hence the
multilateral punishment strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Having the credibility
of multilateral punishment rest on a knife-edge result, however, is unsatisfactory. Clearly,
Maymun be Khalpha considered that punishing the Sicilian agent was costly."
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erties of the multilateral punishment strategy equilibrium? One way of doing
so is to follow Greif (2006) in assuming that cheating by any agent is pub-
licly observed, so he will be identified as a cheater even if the merchant he is
engaged by does not wish to report the transgression. Then, assuming that
all other merchants will follow the hypothesized equilibrium strategy of not
hiring an agent who has cheated, the merchant in question will also wish to
follow the equilibrium strategy and fire the agent.19 That is, in the presence
of small switching costs, the assumption of multilateral perfect information
is necessary to support cooperation in equilibrium.
From the evidence provided by Greif (1993)(2006) and Goitein (1973),
it seems doubtful that it could be argued that this is a realistic approach.
Some third-party monitoring of agents appears to have occurred, but it is
not clear that an agent could be identified as a cheater if the merchant in
question made no such accusation.20 Direct evidence for this comes from the
letters of the Maghribi traders themselves. These show that the Maghribis
sometimes kept their aﬀairs secret from other traders, and felt the need to
inform their trading partners of the transgressions or good behavior of the
agents they had dealings with. For example, in Letter 8 of Goitein (1973),
a Maghribi trader acting as an agent informed his correspondent that the
consignment he was in charge of was the property of a certain other trader,
"...but no one knows this except myself."21 He also added that this trader
had acted honorably when acting as an agent for him, so "... no heedlessness
is permissible with regard to his rights." In another letter, a trader involved
in a lawsuit before the rabbinical court of Fustat expressed his wish that
his opponent would have returned "to the right way...so that I would not be
forced to make known his doings to the communities of Israel in east and
19This assumes that the switching costs are small enough relative to the wage diﬀerential,
W ∗c −W ∗. We shall always assume that switching costs are "small" in the relevant sense
in what follows.
20For example, Greif (2006), pp. 67-68, tells us that agents’ remuneration typically
included both a wage and a share of the trading profits. It seems unlikely that the
balance between these variables in any particular merchant-agent relationship was publicly
observed, so no third party could necessarily verify that an agent had cheated in the
absence of an accusation from the merchant involved.
21The agent was evidently confiding in his correspondent to avoid any risk of being
accused of having absconded with the merchant’s goods, should anything untoward have
occurred to the merchant in question on a sea voyage.
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west."22
Thus although merchants may have been able to monitor the actions of
their own agents with considerable accuracy - justifying the assumption of
bilateral perfect information as a reasonable approximation - it seems clear
that they did not directly observe the actions of other merchants’ agents,
but needed to be informed of them. Hence the assumption of publicly ob-
servable actions seems untenable as an approach to sustaining multilateral
punishment strategies as an equilibrium.
Another solution which does not require the assumption of multilateral
perfect information is mentioned in the historical evidence, however. An
agent who was identified as a cheater could have his record wiped clean by
paying compensation to the merchant he had cheated, i.e. "ostracized agents
were considered cheaters until they compensated the injured party" (Greif,
1993). This compensation scheme plays no role in Greif’s own model, but
it can solve the problem with the equilibrium strategies we have identified
above. To see this, note that a merchant’s lifetime expected profits (denoted
V M) from engaging an agent are
V M =
(γ −W ∗)
(1− δ) , (3)
if he is not cheated, and
V M =
δ(γ −W ∗)
(1− δ) − ς, (4)
if he is cheated once and then expects to return to the equilibrium path
of play with a diﬀerent agent, where ς > 0 is his switching cost.23 If he
is cheated once and then expects to return to the equilibrium path of play
with the same agent, however, he saves the switching cost ς, and so strictly
prefers retaining the agent who cheated him over incurring the cost of finding
a new agent. The equilibrium in multilateral punishment strategies cannot
be sustained.
22Goitein (1973), Letter 17.
23Throughout what follows we will ignore the fact that merchants will be forced to
switch agents by exogenous events, which could be dealt with by subtracting the discounted
expected lifetime switching costs thereby incurred from these and the following expressions.
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Suppose instead that a merchant who fires a cheating agent can expect to
receive a compensation payment with a present discounted value of C. His
profits from switching agents are then,
V M =
δ(γ −W ∗)
(1− δ) − ς + C. (5)
So long as C > ς, the merchant strictly prefers to fire the agent as required
to sustain the equilibrium strategies. Can such a compensation system sus-
tain both the agents’ and merchants’ incentives so that agents are hired in
equilibrium?
First note that for any level of compensation, a merchant prefers to retain
an agent who cheats and then immediately pays compensation over firing
the agent. So we need to find a wage rate and levels of compensation which
induce agents to act honestly, and which induce agents who have cheated to
prefer paying compensation immediately over becoming unemployed forever
(or paying compensation later). Proposition 2 establishes the required wage
and compensation levels.
Proposition 2 There exists a minimum wage rate cW and maximum com-
pensation levels, bC0, bC1, such that:
(i) agents (weakly) prefer playing honest over cheating and paying the
compensation bC0 immediately;
(ii) agents (weakly) prefer paying the compensation bC0 immediately over
becoming unemployed forever;
(iii) an agent who has cheated in period t will (weakly) prefer to pay the
compensation bC0 immediately over waiting one period and paying compensa-
tion bC1 in period t+ 1;
(iv) an agent who has cheated in period t and not paid the compensationbC0 will (weakly) prefer to pay the compensation bC1 immediately over staying
unemployed forever; and
(v) an agent who has cheated in period t and not paid the compensationbC0 will (weakly) prefer to pay the compensation bC1 immediately over waiting
one more period before paying compensation.
In addition, cWc > cW, so the wage required to induce cooperation from
agents who have cheated in the past and not paid compensation exceeds the
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wage required to induce cooperation from ‘honest’ agents. Further, cW =
W ∗ as defined in Proposition 1, so the same level of trade is sustained in
equilibrium.
Proof. For an agent to prefer being honest over cheating once and paying
compensation immediately, we must have
Vh ≥ α− bC0 + (1− τ)δVh + τδV uh , (6)
or bC0 ≥ α − cW . That is, if the agent cheats to obtain α, if he imme-
diately pays compensation he stays on the equilibrium path and receives
(1 − τ)δVh + τδV uh from that point onward. In order for an agent to pre-
fer paying compensation immediately over becoming unemployed forever we
must have,
− bC0 + (1− τ)δVh + τδV uh ≥ δV uc , (7)
or, bC0 ≤ Vh −cW − δV uc .
We must show three further things to establish the result. First, that
an agent who has cheated in period t will prefer to pay compensation im-
mediately over waiting one period and paying compensation in period t+ 1;
second, that an agent who has cheated in period t and not paid compensa-
tion will prefer to pay compensation in period t+n, n = 1, 2, ..., over staying
unemployed forever; and third, that an agent who has cheated and not paid
compensation at any point in the past will always prefer to pay immediately
over waiting one more period before paying compensation. The first requires,
− bC0 + (1− τ)δVh + τδV uh ≥ −δ bC1 + δV uh (8)
where the compensation payment required from period t+1 onwards is bC1.24
This implies that, bC1 ≥ bC0δ − (1− τ)(Vh − V uh ). (9)
The second requires that,
− bC1 + V uh ≥ V uc , (10)
24Note that an agent who pays compensation in period t + n, n = 1, 2, ... joins the
honest agents’ "unemployment queue" and obtains the expected payoﬀ V uh from that
point forward.
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or bC1 ≤ V uh − V uc . Third, we must have,
− bC1 + V uh ≥ w − δ bC1 + δV uh , (11)
or bC1 ≤ V uh − V uc .
Setting bC0 = Vh −cW − δV uc (i.e. at its maximum) and substituting, we
may rewrite (9) as, bC1 ≥ V uh − V uc . (12)
So we must have bC1 = V uh − V uc . The lowest wage cW consistent with these
conditions is then given by cW = α− bC0. At this wage rate
α−cW = bC0 = Vh −cW − δV uc , (13)
hence α = Vh − δV uc , or Vh(cW ) = α + δV uc . From Proposition 1 it follows
immediately that cW =W ∗ and bC1 < α.
It remains to show that cW < cWc. This can be easily established by
following a similar line of reasoning to that employed above. If a cheating
agent who hasn’t paid compensation is rehired, his expected lifetime utility
is
Vc =cWc + (1− τ)δVc + τδ(V uh − bC1), (14)
since if he loses his employment due to exogenous events the agent’s opti-
mal strategy is to pay the compensation bC1 in the following period. For
the agent to prefer being honest over cheating and paying compensation eC0
immediately requires,
Vc ≥ α− eC0 + (1− τ)δVc + τδ(V uh − bC1), (15)
or eC0 ≥ α−cWc. For the agent to prefer paying compensation immediately
over becoming unemployed forever requires,
− eC0 + (1− τ)δVc + τδ(V uh − bC1) ≥ δV uc , (16)
or, eC0 ≤ Vc−cWc−δV uc . Since the agent will never be willing to pay 2 bC1 if he
is fired for cheating a second time, we need consider no further conditions.
Thus (cWc, eC0) must satisfy,
α−cWc ≤ eC0 ≤ Vc −cWc − δV uc . (17)
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Finding the lowest wage and highest level of compensation which induce
cooperation requires Vc(cWc) = α+δV uc . It follows immediately thatcWc >cW
and eC0 < bC0. Hence merchants always prefer to hire an agent who has never
cheated (or an agent who has cheated and paid compensation), over hiring
an agent who has cheated and not paid compensation.
Under the wage-compensation scheme specified in Proposition 2, a mer-
chant receives at most α−cW from an agent who has cheated, so merchants
are not fully compensated. Since merchants still strictly prefer to receive bC0
from their current agent over firing them and searching for a new agent, for
any ς > 0 merchants will retain cheating agents who pay them the required
compensation.
Traders’ strategies in the equilibrium with compensation are then: (i)
honest agents are oﬀered cW in every period; (ii) an agent who cheats in any
period is fired unless he immediately pays compensation bC0 to the original
merchant; (iii) an unemployed cheater is never employed by any merchant
until he pays compensation bC1 to the original merchant; and (iv) agents are
honest if oﬀered cW, pay compensation bC0 immediately if they cheat, and
merchants only hire honest agents.
In this equilibrium, a merchant will never hire an agent who has cheated
and not paid compensation for the same reason that merchants don’t hire
cheating agents in Greif’s model, i.e. because cWc > cW . The compensation
payments, however, have resolved the issue of why a merchant should fire a
cheating agent who hasn’t paid compensation. He will do so because if the
agent has cheated and hasn’t paid compensation in period t, the agent’s best
response to being fired and unemployed in period t+1 is to pay compensation
in period t+ 1.
The remaining issue with the equilibrium strategies is that merchants
now strictly prefer to declare their current agent a cheater in order to receive
the compensation bC0, whether he has cheated or not, over retaining an hon-
est agent.25 So long as disputes over whether or not an agent had cheated
could be adjudicated with reasonable accuracy, however, false accusations of
cheating were unlikely to occur. Greif (2006) argues that this was the case,
and also that making false declarations would be very costly to merchants,
25In Greif (1993) merchants have no positive incentive to make false declarations of
cheating.
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vis26
"False accusations of cheating were curtailed by the extensive
use of witnesses to testify to one’s honesty. ... Eleventh cen-
tury Maghribi agents generally conducted important business in
the presence of other coalition members. In their reports they in-
cluded the names of witnesses the merchant knew, thus enabling
the merchant to verify the agent’s report."
And ,
"an insider merchant puts his own reputation on the line in ac-
cusing an agent.”
To model this we assume, as indicated by the historical record, that a
merchant who made a dishonest report would be discovered with some prob-
ability ρ ∈ (0, 1), and would be unable to hire agents in the future, because
they would cheat him and not pay compensation. As Greif (1993) notes,
traders who had been accused of cheating could in turn be cheated by other
Maghribi traders without their being subject to community retaliation.27
The historical documents do not specify the duration of such a punishment
strategy, so we will assume that it lasts for a single period only. A merchant
who makes a false accusation of cheating would then have an expected payoﬀ
V Mc (ρ) given by,
V Mc (ρ) = (1− ρ)
"
(γ −cW ) + bC0 + δ(γ −cW )
(1− δ)
#
(18)
+ρ
"
(γ −cW ) + δ2(γ −cW )
(1− δ)
#
,
26See Greif (2006), p. 64 and p. 82.
27Greif (1993), p. 535, tells us that "an agent who cheated a cheater" was not subject to
multilateral punishment (see also Goitein, 1973, p.104; and Greif, 1989). Similar forms of
punishment strategy are found among the Orma herders of East Africa (Ensminger, 1992,
Chapter 4; Dixit, 2004, p. 62), and the Ju/’hoansi bushmen (Wiessner, 2005). ‘Cheat
the cheater’ strategies of a diﬀerent type to those employed by the Maghribis, Orma or
Ju/’hoansi are used by Kletzer and Wright (2000) to support renegotiation-proof equilibria
in a repeated borrower-lender game. Their strategies require a ‘coalition’ of a borrower
and a lender to form to upset the strategy of a lender who has failed to cooperate in the
borrower’s punishment.
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since a merchant’s payoﬀ from being cheated once is just 0. Ensuring that
cheating by making a false declaration is unprofitable requires that V M ≥
V Mc (ρ), or
(1− ρ) bC0 ≤ ρδ(γ −cW ) (19)
Hence for a probability of detection in the range ρ ∈ [ρ, 1), where ρ is defined
by V M = V Mc (ρ), making a false declaration will be unprofitable.
28
Proposition 3 Assume δ, τ ∈ (0, 1), h = τMA−(1−τ)M and the wage rate and
compensation levels ( cW, bC0, bC1) as specified in Proposition 2. Further as-
sume that ρ ≥ bC0
δ(γ−cW )+ bC0 = ρ. Then the strategies specified above form a
"weakly renegotiation-proof" equilibrium.
Proof. The result follows directly from the natural generalization of the Far-
rell and Maskin (1989) definition of weakly renegotiation-proof strategies,29
and the construction of the strategies specified above.
This structure of the equilibrium strategies appears to more accurately
reflect actual Maghribi practice and the informational constraints they op-
erated under. Indeed, an equilibrium supported by compensation strategies
has a number of desirable properties. First, it utilizes the Maghribi’s ac-
tual ‘punishment strategies’ to resolve the issue of why traders should fire
cheating agents, and also to explain how merchants were discouraged from
making false declarations of cheating. In doing so it dispenses with the need
to assume either that the actions of all agents were observable by all mer-
chants, including those they did not employ, or that agent switching costs
were literally zero.
Second, it explains whymerchants’ incentives to make false declarations of
cheating (in order to obtain compensation) needed to be as closely monitored
as agents’ incentives to cheat merchants. The purpose of witnesses was as
much to protect agents from false accusations, as to protect merchants from
28Note that agents will strictly prefer to cheat a merchant who has cheated, under the
specified punishment strategy. A suﬃcient condition for a merchant to prefer submitting to
the punishment, as opposed to operating outside the coalition forever is, [1− δ(1− δ)] (γ−cW ) ≥ δκ. This is true for all δ ∈ (0, 1) given our assumption that γ−cW −κ > 0, i.e. that
mutually profitable trade can be supported in equilibrium.
29See Farrell’s (2000) definition of "quasi symmetric weak renegotiation-proofness"; also
Aramendia, Larrea and Ruiz (2005), Definition 2.
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being embezzled. A high enough probability of detection of false accusations
(ρ) was essential to sustaining merchant-agent cooperation.
Third, it is a more eﬃcient institution in a world of imperfect information
and imperfect monitoring in which some "mistakes" or "transgressions" were
likely to occur. It saves both on the costs of firing agents who have cheated,
and also on the cost of permanently ostracizing valuable trading partners
from the coalition. Since the model with perfect and complete information
is clearly intended only as an approximation to the ‘noisier’ world in which
the Maghribis actually operated, this is a desirable property.30
The interesting historical questions are then, what level of compensation
payment was required by the Maghribi traders? How were disputes over
whether or not an agent had cheated resolved? Did merchants retain (or
immediately rehire) agents who paid them compensation?
Again, evidence in the Maghribi’s letters provides some support for our
approach. The merchant writing in Letter 18 cited above makes it clear that
if his opponent in the lawsuit had "reconsidered the aﬀair" and paid him the
compensation for losses he thought was owed, he would have re-established
normal commercial relations with him, and not have "made known his do-
ings." Another trader writing in Letter 51 explains that a similar dispute he
was involved in was settled, and he had released his agent from his debt for
a payment of 100 dinars. He invited his correspondent to "please take note
of this," implying that re-establishing normal commercial relations with the
agent was now considered permissible. And Greif (1993), p. 530, tells us that
the Maghribi traders ostracized an agent in Jerusalem who had embezzled
the money of one of them and, "only after a compromise was reached and he
had compensated the oﬀended merchant, were commercial relations with him
resumed."
30Two diﬀerent models in which bilateral imperfect information leads to such ‘mistakes’
occurring with positive probability are considered in Sections 3 and 4 below.
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3 AModel with Trading Uncertainty and En-
dogenous Levels of Trade
The two models of Maghribi trading relationships considered in Section 2
both predict that cooperative trade will be sustained at a wage rate of
W ∗ = cW, and that no punishments or compensation payments will ever
occur. In this sense the predictions of the models are observationally equiv-
alent, so one might ask what the point was of introducing compensation
payments in the first place. One good answer is that it is important to
model historical ‘institutions’ as they actually were, even if other models or
diﬀerent ‘institutions’ can yield the same or similar results. The purpose
of the historical enquiry is to understand how the obstacles to trade in the
early Mediterranean period were overcome in the absence of reliable or en-
forceable legal contracts. An imperfect ability to monitor the behavior of
other merchants’ agents, and the costs of switching agents, were both ob-
stacles to incentive-compatible trade faced by the Maghribi traders, so any
realistic model should take them into account.31
Nevertheless, an important advantage of the actual Maghribi practice of
requiring agents who had ‘cheated’ to pay compensation, was that it was a
more eﬃcient institution in the face of uncertainty, or an inability to perfectly
monitor any agents’ actions.32 So it will be useful to provide an example of a
model in which merchants and their agents face significant uncertainty, and
in which the predictions of the two models no longer coincide.
Trade in the early Mediterranean period was a risky activity, and subject
to possible calamity. Ships and their cargoes could be lost at sea, or rerouted
by storms, and land voyages were equally fraught with dangers.33 Hence when
31Indeed, as we have argued in this paper, the Maghribis probably could not have
sustained trade solely on the basis of the collective punishment strategy considered by
Greif (1993), since any such strategy would have failed to provide adequate incentives to
fire cheating agents.
32And Greif (2006), p.65, tells us that, "the ability to monitor was imperfect; a merchant
could mistakenly conclude that an agent was dishonest."
33The letters in Goitein (1973) provide many interesting and vivid examples of this.
Goitein (1973), pp. 7-8, notes that, "a man shipping his goods overseas normally had to
wait months before he could know what happened to them," and mentions ‘whims of nature’
such as storms at sea, famines and epidemics, as well as ruthless governments and "the
constant menaces of piracy and war", as all impinging upon the reliability of trade (see
also Goitein, 1973, pp. 10-11). Letter 9 of Goitein, for example, concerns a shipment of
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an agent was entrusted with a merchant’s goods, there was always some risk
that he would be unable to make good on his employment contract for reasons
which were beyond his control. Although in many cases merchants would
have been able to verify reports of losses from their agents due to ‘whims of
nature’, there were also occasions when such verification was not possible.34
In such events, merchants would have needed to decide whether to punish
their agent for cheating, or to simply let bygones be bygones. Punishing the
agent may have meant perpetrating an injustice against the innocent, but
letting bygones be bygones would have provided strong incentives for the
false reporting of losses by agents.35
To encompass these possibilities in the simplest possible way, we will
assume that in any period a merchant’s goods could be unverifiably lost with
probability λ ∈ (0, 1), where it is intended that λ is relatively small number.
We first consider how the introduction of such uncertainty aﬀects the viability
of a collective punishment strategy based on permanent exclusion, as in Greif
(1993), and then how the situation changes when compensation payments
are re-introduced.36 To allow for a meaningful comparison with the model
without trading uncertainty however, it will first be useful to enrich Greif’s
original model so that the level of trade achieved in equilibrium is determined
endogenously, rather than fixed exogenously.
3.1 Endogenous Levels of Trade
In Greif (1993), the gross value of trade realized by a merchant-agent re-
lationship in any period is fixed exogenously at γ. This means that trade
is either fully eﬃcient, i.e. when W ∗ ≤ γ − κ, or that no trade occurs at
all. To allow for diﬀerent levels of trade to be achieved in equilibrium, we
betel nuts lost to Indian pirates.
34Letter 1 in Goitein (1973) provides a clear illustration of this.
35Letter 1 of Goitein (1973) concerns a merchant who had withdrawn cooperation from
a former agent over a shipment of brazilwood which had gone astray, and for which the
merchant had not received compensation. Letter 36 clearly shows that traders acting as
agents could be held accountable for losses due to ‘shipwreck and other misfortunes.’ See
also Goitein (1954).
36Greif (2006), footnote 45, p. 73, suggests a more complex model in which revenue is a
random variable ex observed by the agent, and the merchant learns the actual realization
of ex with positive probability. The additional realism achieved over our simpler approach
would not appear to repay the extra costs in complexity.
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will now think of γ ≥ 0 as an input into the trading relationship supplied
by the merchant (i.e. the amount of capital invested or goods shipped to
the agent), and assume that the gross gains from trade are determined by
a function f(γ). The function f(·) is assumed nonnegative with f(0) = 0,
twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and strictly concave. f(·) thus achieves a
maximum at a unique value γ > 0 where f 0(γ) = 0, and we assume f(γ) > γ
for all γ ∈ (0, γ]. Hence, there are diminishing marginal returns to investing
in the trading relationship in any period, and the eﬃcient level of investment
is γ.37. We will also assume, as seems natural, that the profit an agent can
obtain from cheating a merchant is an increasing function of the level of in-
vestment chosen in any period. We specify this function by α(γ), with α(·)
nonnegative and α(0) = 0, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, concave and
f(γ) ≥ α(γ) for all γ ∈ [0, γ]. Finally, we assume κ > f(γ) − α(γ), for all
γ ≥ 0.
From Proposition 1 it is immediate that the minimum wage rate required
to induce cooperation from agents in every period is now given by
W ∗(γ) = [T − δτH]α(γ), (20)
and is strictly increasing in γ.38 In order to obtain results on the levels of
trade achieved in equilibrium, it will be useful to have the following definition.
We will say that f(·) is "more concave" than α(·) on (0, γ) if the ratio rf =
−f 00
f 0 exceeds the ratio rα =
−α00
α0 everywhere on (0, γ).
39 We may then state
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If rf > rα, the eﬃcient level of trade γ cannot be sustained
in equilibrium.
Proof. Amerchant’s per-period payoﬀ in a stationary equilibrium is given by
V M = f(γ)−W ∗(γ). So a merchant’s profit is maximized by choosing a level
37See Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) for a similar specification of a ‘trading tech-
nology’.
38That is, W ∗(γ) solves Vh(W ) = α(γ) + δV uc . To simplify the exposition we have now
assumed that w = 0, so V uc = 0. This is without further loss of generality. Following Greif
(1993), we will also assume throughout the following discussion that trade is individually
rational for merchants at the equilibrium levels of W and γ.
39This is just the standard definition of the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion (c.f. Mas
Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, p. 191). From now on the statement ‘rf > rα’ will
subsume the qualifying condition ‘everywhere on (0, γ)0.
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of investment γ∗ such that f 0(γ∗) = ∂W
∗(γ)
∂γ , or f
0(γ∗) = [T − δτH]α0(γ∗).
rf > rα implies that α0(γ) > 0, so we must have γ∗ < γ.
The assumption that f(·) is more concave than α(·) implies that, over
the relevant range, the gains obtained from cheating increase more rapidly
than the gains from cooperation, f(γ).40 Thus if we choose the natural
specification α(γ) = γ, so that what the agent obtains from cheating is
the merchant’s investment, the eﬃcient level of trade cannot be achieved.
Alternatively, if we specify the gains from cheating as a function αf(γ),
α ∈ (0, 1], then α0(γ) = 0 and the eﬃcient level of investment will be obtained
in equilibrium. Roughly speaking, ineﬃcient investment occurs when the gain
from cheating is an increasing function of the merchant’s investment, but
some level of cooperation between the merchant and agent is still required
to realize the full value of trade f(γ). This formulation would appear to
be most consistent with Greif’s (1993) requirement that cheating entail an
eﬃciency loss. In this case, agents’ incentive constraints imply that γ cannot
be achieved, since over the range [γ, γ], increases in merchant investment
require proportionately larger increases in the eﬃciency wage to oﬀset the
enhanced incentives for cheating.
3.2 Trading Uncertainty and Exclusion
We now introduce trading uncertainty into the model, and consider the pun-
ishment strategy which specifies that following any unverifiable report of
losses by an agent, the agent is fired and never rehired by any merchant.
Since merchants cannot distinguish between unverifiable reports of losses
and actual cheating, neither can the collective punishment strategy.41
To fix the one-period extensive form, assume that at the beginning of any
period each merchant sends his goods to an agent, and the goods are lost in
transit with probability λ. If the agent receives the goods, he decides whether
to cheat or be honest given the wage rate Wλ(γ) he has been oﬀered. At the
end of the period, the agent either returns f(γ)−Wλ(γ) to the merchant, or
40The relevant range is [γ, γ], where γ < γ is defined by f 0(γ) = α0(γ).
41Hence, as in the model of Green and Porter (1984), punishment is not triggered by
the inference that an agent has cheated, rather it is a self-enforcing reaction to a report of
losses required to sustain the equilibrium incentives.
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reports that the goods have been lost. In the latter case the agent obtains a
payoﬀ of either 0 or α(γ), and is subject to the collective punishment strategy.
In order to analyze the multi-period game, we first modify Greif’s model
by assuming that when an agent is fired for cheating, he can be immediately
replaced by another agent, so that the total number of ‘honest’ agents re-
mains constant over time. That is, we suppose that merchants hire agents
exclusively from a pool of ‘insider’ agents, but that the pool of ‘insiders’ can
be replenished from a large (i.e. eﬀectively infinite) pool of ‘outsider’ agents
when required.42 It is in merchants’ interests to designate a pool of ‘insiders’,
as this allows trade to be sustained by a collective punishment strategy when
trade supported by bilateral punishment strategies is not possible, and results
in lower wage payments otherwise (Greif, 1993, Section 4). And it is easy to
see that hiring only insider agents is a self-enforcing strategy for merchants -
since an outsider never expects to be rehired if (unexpectedly) employed by
a merchant, a higher wage is required to prevent him from cheating.43
The assumption of agent replacement is needed because with trading un-
certainty, in every period t an expected number λAt of agents will gain a
reputation for cheating and be excluded from further trade (where At is the
number of remaining honest agents in period t). So the number of agents
remaining in the game will decrease period-by-period, until eventually too
few honest agents are left to sustain mutually beneficial trade.44 This makes
the equilibrium path of play under exclusion strategies nonstationary and ex-
tremely complex, and comparisons with play under compensation strategies
meaningless. However, it can shown that the assumption of agent replace-
ment leads to the minimum wage and the maximum amount of trade being
sustained in equilibrium for any A ≥ M , so the propositions below remain
42The assumption of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ is needed in order to maintain h > 0;
otherwise the eﬃciency-wage model is degenerate. Goitein (1973), p.13, notes that the
Maghribis often freed former bond-servants and slaves to become respectable merchants
and agents in their own right, illustrating one means by which new members were added
to the coalition.
43See Proposition 1. Merchants would collectively prefer to fix the number of insider
agents at A = M , since this results in the lowest equilibrium wage and the highest level
of trade. We will allow for any value of A ≥M, however.
44When At < M, trade breaks down under our specification of the equilibrium strategies.
See further below.
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true in the absence of this assumption.45
Given this specification, the expected lifetime utility of an employed hon-
est agent at the beginning of any period (i.e. before the trade risk uncertainty
is resolved), is given by
Vhλ = (1− λ) [Wλ(γ) + (1− τ)δVhλ + δτV uhλ] , (21)
for any level of investment γ chosen by the merchant. Since an agent decides
to cheat or be honest after the trade risk uncertainty is resolved, for given
values of λ and γ the lowest wage for which an agent’s best response is to be
honest in any period is then,
W ∗λ (γ) = [Tλ − (1− λ)δτH]α(γ), (22)
where Tλ = 1− (1−λ)δ(1− τ). Comparing this with equation (20) above, it
is immediate that for a given choice of γ, W ∗λ (γ) > W
∗(γ) whenever λ > 0,
and ∂W
∗
λ (γ)
∂λ > 0.
46 In addition, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If rf > rα, for any value of A ≥ M , the equilibrium level
of investment under trading uncertainty is less than the equilibrium level of
investment under bilateral perfect information.
Proof. Merchants will now choose the level of investment γ∗λ to maximize
V Mλ = (1−λ) [f(γ)−W ∗λ (γ)], requiring that f 0(γ∗λ) = [Tλ − (1− λ)δτH]α0(γ∗λ).
Since [Tλ − (1− λ)δτH] > [T − δτH], ∀λ > 0, γ∗λ < γ∗ follows from the fact
that ∂∂γ
³
f 0(γ)
α0(γ)
´
< 0, ∀γ ∈ (0, γ). This in turn follows from the assumption
that rf > rα everywhere on (0, γ).
The addition of trading uncertainty means that agents must be paid a
higher eﬃciency wage for any choice of the level of investment, to compen-
sate them for the risk of being innocently punished when a merchant’s goods
45This is because the expected lifetime utility of an employed honest agent decreases
over time as the probability of trade collapsing increases, while the one-period gain from
cheating is constant. Hence agents must be paid a higher wage to compensate for this risk.
For example, when A = M , the equilibrium wage in the game with agent replacement is
given by (22) below with H = h = 1, i.e. [1 − δ(1 − λ)]α(γ). Without replacement the
equilibrium wage is [1− δ(1− λ)M ]α(γ). The latter exceeds the former for any level of γ
and M > 1.
46Similarly, it is easily checked that W ∗cλ(γ) > W
∗
c (γ) whenever λ > 0, and
∂W∗cλ
∂λ > 0.
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are lost in transit. So it is not surprising that this should result in a lower
value of trade being chosen in equilibrium, once this risk is included in the
model.47 Further, as remarked above, in the model without agent replace-
ment, eventually there will be fewer honest agents remaining in the game
than there are merchants, so the collective punishment strategy specified in
Greif (1993) breaks down. Our equilibrium strategies specify a reversion to
autarky when this happens.48 Although more complex punishment strategies
can be devised to slow down this process, after a suﬃcient amount of time
enough agents will have been accused of cheating so that cooperative trade
supported by exclusion strategies cannot be sustained.49
3.3 Compensation with Trading Uncertainty
Under the punishment strategy requiring that agents pay compensation, even
agents who have not cheated will need to pay C0 in the event that a mer-
chant’s goods are lost.50 So the expected equilibrium payoﬀ from following
an honest strategy (before the trade risk uncertainty is resolved) is given by,
Vhλ = (1− λ)Wλ(γ)− λC0λ(γ) + (1− τ)δVhλ + τδV uhλ. (23)
Since compensation will paid in equilibrium, agents are never fired and re-
main employed by their current merchant with probability 1 − τ . For any
level of investment γ chosen by the merchant, cheating results in an imme-
diate gain of α(γ), so for an agent to prefer being honest over cheating and
paying compensation immediately, we must have
W (γ) + (1− τ)δVhλ + τδV uhλ ≥ α(γ)− C0(γ) + (1− τ)δVhλ + τδV uhλ, (24)
47Whether W ∗λ (γ
∗
λ) ≶ W ∗(γ∗) is indeterminate, however, in the absence of stronger
assumptions on the forms of f(·) and α(·).
48See footnote 13 above. This is arguably ineﬃcient now that these subgames are
reached with positive probability. We could instead specify a reversion to bilateral trading
strategies (see Greif, 1993, Proposition 3), whenever this is possible.
49An obvious alternative is finite punishment strategies. No evidence for these, or any
of the more elaborate punishment strategies one can think of, is provided in the historical
literature, so we will not pursue them further here.
50We will simply assume that agents are capable of making such payments on average.
We could follow Baliga and Evans (2000) or Kletzer and Wright (2000), for example, and
assume that agents receive ‘endowments’ in each period, and that these endowments are
suﬃcient to cover the required expenditures.
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or C0λ(γ) ≥ α(γ)−Wλ(γ). In order for an agent to prefer paying compen-
sation immediately over becoming unemployed forever we require
−C0λ(γ) + (1− τ)δVhλ + τδV uh ≥ 0, (25)
or C0λ(γ) ≤ Vhλ−(1−λ)Wλ(γ)(1−λ) . By following the steps in the proof of Proposition
2, it is easily established that in equilibrium bC0λ(γ) = α(γ)−cWλ(γ), bC1λ(γ) =
V uhλ, and Vhλ(cWλ(γ)) = α(γ)(1−λ). It follows immediately that for any choice
of γ, cWλ(γ) = W ∗λ (γ) and bC1λ(γ) < α(γ)(1 − λ).51 But the equilibrium
value of trade, bγλ, achieved with compensation punishment strategies will in
general diﬀer from that obtained under exclusion strategies.
Proposition 6 If rf > rα, for any value of A ≥ M , the equilibrium level
of investment in the compensation strategy equilibrium under trading un-
certainty exceeds that achieved in the exclusion strategy equilibrium under
trading uncertainty.
Proof. A merchant’s expected per-period payoﬀ in the compensation equi-
librium is,
V Mλ (γ) = (1− λ)
h
f(γ)−cWλ(γ)i+ λ bC0λ(γ). (26)
Substituting bC0λ(γ) = α(γ) − cWλ(γ), and maximizing with respect to γ
yields,
(1−λ) [f 0(bγλ)− (Tλ − (1− λ)δτH)α0(bγλ)]+λα0(bγλ) [1− (Tλ − (1− λ)δτH)] = 0.
(27)
Since the second addend on the LHS of (27) is always positive for λ > 0
and bγλ ≤ γ, this requires f 0(bγλ) < (Tλ − (1− λ)δτH)α0(bγλ), which from our
previous argument implies bγλ > γ∗λ. It is straightforward to show that bγλ < γ
for all λ < 1.
As in the model without trading uncertainty, the two types of collective
punishment strategy provide for the same eﬃciency wage to be paid to agents
for a given value of γ. However, the fact that compensation must now be
paid by agents with probability λ in any period, and that the equilibrium
compensation payment is an increasing function of γ, means that a higher
51Demonstrating that cWλ(γ) < cWcλ(γ) also follows easily from the arguments presented
in Proposition 2.
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level of investment can be sustained in the equilibrium with compensation, at
least when cheating entails an eﬃciency loss. Hence when rf > rα,cWλ(bγλ) >
W ∗λ (γ
∗
λ), i.e. agents are paid a higher wage in the compensation strategy
equilibrium.
In addition, when the pool of available agents is finite, the collective
punishment strategy specifying permanent exclusion from trade eventually
breaks down once a suﬃcient number of agents have acquired a reputation
for cheating, and the long-run result is autarky. This problem clearly does
not beset the punishment strategy requiring incentive-compatible compensa-
tion payments to be made. Since all agents will choose to pay compensation
in equilibrium (whether innocent or guilty), the trading institution does not
break down in the face of bilateral imperfect information. Hence, as claimed
in Section 2, it is a more eﬃcient institution in a world of imperfect informa-
tion or imperfect monitoring in which mistakes or transgressions were likely
to occur.
4 Partnerships and Formal Friendships
A final issue with the model of Maghribi agency relations described in Sec-
tion 2 is that it does not appear to present a very accurate picture of the
Maghribi’s actual organization. Greif (2006), p.285, writes for instance,
"The Maghribi traders were by and large merchants who invested
in trade through horizontal agency relations. Each trader served
as an agent for several merchants while receiving agency services
from them or other traders. ... The horizontal social structure
of the Maghribis is also reflected in the forms of business asso-
ciations through which they established agency relations. They
mainly used partnership and "formal friendship." ... In a "for-
mal friendship” two traders operating in diﬀerent trade centers
provided each other with agency services without pecuniary com-
pensation."
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This structure of trade through partnerships and "formal friendships" is
not that specified in the eﬃciency wage model.52 The Maghribi’s "punish-
ment strategies" were also more elaborate than those allowed for by Greif’s
model, as noted above.53 It is straightforward, and instructive, to capture
some of these elements of the Maghribi organization in a simple model.
4.1 A Simple Model of "Formal Friendships"
Assume now that each trader acts as both a merchant and an agent in a
single merchant-agent relationship ("formal friendship") in each period.54
Merchants still can’t cheat agents, so the honest strategy is for the "trader
as agent" to refrain from embezzling the "trader as merchant’s" goods to
obtain a one-period payoﬀ of α.55 Recall that κ is the payoﬀ of a merchant
who acts on his own behalf, i.e. neither employs an agent nor is employed
as an agent. For a given wageW, an honest trader’s lifetime expected utility
can be written,56
V Th =
(γ −W )
(1− δ) +
W
(1− δ) =
γ
(1− δ) . (28)
The punishment for cheating is that the trader can no longer hire agents
(since they will cheat him free from collective punishment), and can no longer
be hired as an agent. Hence a trader who has cheated is ‘ostracized’ and
receives his reservation utility κ in each period (we maintain the assumption
that w = 0 from the previous section). The profit from cheating, when
cheating is perfectly monitored and all traders adhere to the punishment
52See also Goitein (1967), Chapters III.B.1-III.B.4. Goitein (1987), p.184, notes that
instances of the payment of wages or commissions to agents are "next to nonexistent" in
the Geniza records, and that, "first and foremost, [agency] services were reciprocal."
53In particular, when an agent accused of cheating operated as a merchant, he could in
turn be cheated by his own agents without their being subject to collective punishment.
See Greif (2006). p. 283.
54This is not the same as assuming the purely ‘bilateral’ trading relationships considered
in Greif (1993), Section 4.
55Since it follows immediately from (28) below that the eﬃcient level of investment γ
will be chosen by each trader acting as a merchant, we simplify the exposition by reverting
to the model of Section 2 in which the values of α and γ are exogenously fixed.
56Observe that we are no longer assuming an exogenous probability of merchants firing
agents, i.e. we have set τ = 0.
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strategy, is
V Tc = (γ −W ) + α+
δκ
(1− δ) . (29)
That is, the "trader as merchant" receives γ−W and the "trader as agent"
obtains α from cheating his partner in the formal friendship. The lowest
wage required to ensure that cheating is not profitable is then,
W ∗ =Max
·
0, α− δ(γ − κ)
(1− δ)
¸
. (30)
Note that W ∗ = 0 is a possibility,57 as seems to have been the custom in
formal friendship trading relationships.
According to the Maghribi’s practice, described in Section 2 above, any
trader who enters into a formal friendship with a trader who has cheated in
the past can cheat that trader without facing the threat of future collective
punishment. Since this is always profitable, even in the presence of small
switching costs, a cheater’s best response is also to cheat in such relationship,
so they will not be formed in the first place. This is because the honest trader
can expect to earn at most α+ δγ
(1−δ) from such a trading relationship, which
is less than it can earn from establishing a formal friendship with another
honest trader. Thus for any wage rate weakly exceeding W ∗, cheating is
unprofitable and the collective punishment is self-enforcing.58
The only unresolved question is why a trader should fire (or break oﬀ a
formal friendship trading relationship) , as opposed to not hire, a trader who
has cheated in the past. But the argument just outlined above works equally
well here also. A trader who is cheated in period t can cheat his period
t trading partner in period t + 1 free from any threat of future collective
punishment. Given this, the trader who has cheated in period t will cheat
again period t+1. So for switching costs which are not too large, the cheated
trader will prefer to dissolve the current relationship and search for an honest
trading partner.
What role, then, does the Maghribi’s compensation scheme have to play
in this context? Presumably it allows players who would otherwise be per-
manently ostracized to return to the equilibrium path of play, avoiding the
57Specifically, W ∗ = 0 whenever δ ≥ αα+γ−κ , where
1
2 <
α
α+γ−κ < 1 by assumption.
58This was not true in the one-sided eﬃciency wage model considered in Section 2,
because in that model merchants had no opportunities to profitably cheat agents who had
cheated them in the past.
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ineﬃciencies associated with following an exclusion strategy in the presence
of trading uncertainty, as in Section 3. When we introduce such trading un-
certainty into the model, it is easily checked that the expected lifetime utility
of following the honest strategy is then,
V Thλ =
(1− λ)γ + λ δκ
1−δ
1− δ(1− λ) . (31)
Hence
W ∗λ =Max
·
0, α− δ
µ
(1− λ)γ − κ
1− δ(1− λ)
¶¸
, (32)
so as in the model of Section 3, a higher equilibrium wage may be required
to enforce cooperation in the presence of trading uncertainty.
Honest agents are now subject to collective punishment in each period
with probability λ. If the pool of available agents is not infinite (i.e. if
we do not assume agent replacement), under exclusion strategies all traders
will eventually be ostracized. The Maghribi’s compensation scheme again
solves this problem. By following the steps in the proof of Proposition 2, it is
easily established that the maximum compensation that a first-time cheating
agent can be induced to pay is bC0λ = δ ³ (1−λ)γ−κ1−δ ´ . From the conditioncWλ ≥ α− bC0λ, we then obtaincWλ =Max ·0, α− δµ(1− λ)γ − κ
1− δ
¶¸
. (33)
Following the construction of Proposition 2 it is immediate that bC1λ = bC0λδ .
In the model with agent replacement, the two types of collective punish-
ment strategy no longer provide for the same eﬃciency wage to be paid to
agents in equilibrium, at least when W ∗λ > 0. Compensation punishment
strategies allow for (weakly) lower wages, and higher trader welfare, in equi-
librium because they eliminate the risk that traders acting as agents will be
ostracized when a merchant’s goods are inadvertently lost in transit. Since
traders’ expected payoﬀs in a formal friendship relationship are independent
of both the level of the wage and the compensation payment, eliminating
this risk results in strictly higher equilibrium payoﬀs.59 In the model with-
out agent replacement, of course, exclusion strategies eventually eliminate
59The expected lifetime utility of following the honest strategy with compensation strate-
gies is V Thλ =
(1−λ)γ
1−δ . This exceeds (31) whenever (1−λ)γ > κ, which is required for trade
to be individually rational.
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all trading partners, so incentive-compatible trade cannot be sustained, in
contrast to the game with compensation strategies.
In this simple model of formal friendships, compensation does not play
the key role in sustaining incentives to follow the equilibrium strategies that
it does in the "one-sided" eﬃciency wage model. This is because a for-
mal friendship trade relationship is more like the Prisoners’ Dilemma model
of merchant trade studied, for example, by Milgrom, North and Weingast
(1990), in which both parties have opportunities to profitably cheat their
current trading partner.60 Compensation still has a crucial role to play,
however, in permitting incentive-compatible trade to continue in the face of
trading uncertainty or bilateral imperfect information.
5 Conclusion
In their well-known paper on the medieval merchant guilds, Greif, Milgrom
and Weingast (1994), p. 746, write:
"A comprehensive analysis of a contract enforcement institution
must consider why the institution was needed, what sanctions were
to be used to deter undesirable behavior, who was to apply the
sanctions, how the sanctioners learned or decided what sanctions
to apply, why they did not shirk from their duty, and why the
oﬀender did not flee to avoid the sanctions."
The purpose of this paper has been to attempt to fulfill these criteria
with respect to the organization of trade between the early Mediterranean
Maghribi traders. Greif’s (1993) model of trade amongst the Maghribis rep-
resented an attempt to find ‘plausible’ punishment strategies which did not
rely on second (or higher)-order punishments to sustain cooperation. His
equilibrium strategies, however, required either the assumption of zero agent
switching costs, or multilateral perfect information. We have argued that
neither of these assumptions is justified by the historical evidence, leading
60Compensation imposed by a Law Merchant is required in Milgrom, North and Wein-
gast (1990) because in their model traders only ever meet once, so a cheated trader requires
an incentive to impose sanctions when this is a personally costly activity. See also Aoki
(2001), Chapter 3.3, for an exposition of this model.
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to a reconsideration.61 This has led us to develop two diﬀerent models of
Maghribi trade relationships which bring into play, in an essential way, his-
torical features of the Maghribi’s organization which had no role in Greif’s
own analysis.
Our ‘compensation-based’ equilibrium strategies would seem to more ac-
curately reflect Maghribi practices, and have a number of desirable proper-
ties. They utilize the Maghribi’s actual ‘punishment strategies’ to sustain a
cooperative equilibrium, and reveal the crucial importance of discouraging
merchants from making false declarations of cheating. They also explain how
the Maghribis avoided the ineﬃciencies involved in permanently ostracizing
valuable trading partners in the face of uncertainty or bilateral imperfect
information, while still providing incentives for cooperation.
An important part of the literature on infinitely repeated games has been
concerned with the issue of the credibility of multi-level punishment strategies
when punishment is costly to both the ‘cheater’ and the ‘cheated’.62 The
concept of "renegotiation-proofness", taken to its logical limits, implies that
such punishments will frequently not be viable, because rational players will
wish to renegotiate if they (unexpectedly) reach a subgame in which they are
called on to implement them. Farrell (2000) puts the argument well:
"If, indeed, players can eﬃciently coordinate on an equilibrium,
what would really happen after (out of equilibrium) one player
cheated? If the pre-specified punishment would hurt the innocent
as well as the guilty, then we might well expect renegotiation,
perhaps in the simple form of an agreement to ignore the trans-
gression "this time". Such undiscriminating punishments may
therefore lack credibility, even if they are subgame perfect."
61Greif himself is sharply critical of analyses (such as Milgrom, North and Weingast,
1990), employing ‘microanalytic’ models which identify theoretical possibilities but do not
establish that they "correspond to a historical reality." Especially when such analyses "do
not make use of relevant historical details." See Greif (2006), Section 10.3.
62See in particular Farrell and Maskin (1989) and Bernheim and Ray (1989). The
equilibrium strategies described in Section 2 are ‘weakly renegotiation-proof’ according to
at least one definition, as observed in Proposition 3. Baliga and Evans (2000) show how
strongly renegotiation-proof equilibria can be constructed in two-player repeated games
when side-payments (i.e. compensation payments) are permitted.
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Other authors have argued that the Farrell and Maskin (1989) concept
of (weak) renegotiation-proofness is too strong, and takes the logic of sub-
game perfection beyond its reasonable limits.63 Despite (or perhaps because
of) the inconclusiveness of this debate, the Maghribi traders seem to have
resolved the problem for themselves over one thousand years ago. Instead
of demanding that traders implement costly punishments, requiring rein-
forcement by ‘cheaters’ in the form of second-level punishments (and so on),
they devised a more robust and more eﬃcient institution. The Maghribi’s
compensation scheme gave merchants positive incentives not to renegotiate
with cheaters, and gave agents accused of cheating a means of reestablishing
their reputations, hence avoiding the costs of permanent ostracism. As such,
the Maghribi’s organization may have foreshadowed developments in game
theory which took another thousand years to emerge.
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